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Two Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium?1
Christian W. Bach?? and Andrés Perea? ? ?2
Abstract. Correlated equilibrium constitutes one of the basic solution3
concepts for static games with complete information. Actually two vari-4
ants of correlated equilibrium are in circulation and have been used inter-5
changeably in the literature. Besides the original notion due to Aumann6
(1974), there exists a simplified definition typically called canonical cor-7
related equilibrium or correlated equilibrium distribution. It is known8
that the original and the canonical version of correlated equilibrium are9
equivalent from an ex-ante perspective. However, we show that they are10
actually distinct – both doxastically as well as behaviourally – from an11
interim perspective. An elucidation of this difference emerges in the rea-12
soning realm: while Aumann’s correlated equilibrium can be epistemi-13
cally characterized by common belief in rationality and a common prior,14
canonical correlated equilibrium additionally requires the condition of15
one-theory-per-choice. Consequently, the application of correlated equi-16
librium requires a careful choice of the appropriate variant.17
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1 Introduction23
Correlated equilibrium has been introduced by Aumann (1974) and represents24
one of the main solution concepts for static games with complete information.25
Two versions of this solution concept circulate in the literature and often no26
distinction is drawn between them. Indeed, both solution concepts are equiva-27
lent in terms of the (prior) probabilities assigned to choice profiles. Thus, both28
versions are rather perceived as substitutable. However, it turns out that the29
variation in defining correlated equilibrium can be significant from the so-called30
interim perspective once the probabilities are conditionalized on information.31
Both a player’s belief about the opponents’ choices as well as a player’s optimal32
choice in line with the two notions then becomes different. This discrepancy can33
be elucidated in terms of reasoning by unveiling the epistemic assumptions un-34
derlying the two solution concepts. Consequently, care should be exerted when35
applying correlated equilibrium. The use of the particular version of correlated36
equilibrium should be driven by deliberate reflection about which of the – dis-37
tinct – underlying epistemic assumptions are more appropriate for the specific38
purpose at hand.39
Formally, Aumann’s (1974) original solution concept of correlated equilib-40
rium is constructed within an epistemic framework based on possible worlds,41
information partitions, and a common prior probability measure. Often, in sci-42
entific articles and game theory textbooks, a more direct definition of correlated43
equilibrium is used that simply models correlated equilibrium as a probability44
measure on choice combinations. The latter solution concept is sometimes called45
canonical correlated equilibrium (e.g. Forges, 1990) or correlated equilibrium46
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distribution (e.g. Aumann, 1987) in the literature. The question arises whether47
these two definitions are actually interchangeable or whether they constitute two48
different solution concepts.49
The analysis of games typically distinguishes three perspectives or stages:50
ex-ante, interim, and ex-post. From the ex-ante perspective players have not51
received any private information; epistemically players entertain prior beliefs52
in this stage of the game. Then, private information is unveiled to the players53
who update (or revise) their beliefs accordingly; the formation of these posterior54
beliefs as well as the subsequent choices take place in the interim stage of the55
game. From the ex-post perspective the outcome of the game as combination of56
the players’ choices ensues.57
Besides, solution concepts can generally not be compared directly due to58
possibly being embedded in different structures. For instance, the formulation of59
correlated equilibrium uses an epistemic framework, while canonical correlated60
equilibrium lacks such structure. However, since solution concepts all induce for61
every player decision-relevant i.e. interim beliefs about his opponents’ choices,62
these beliefs as well as optimal choice in line with them can serve as a universal63
benchmark. In other words, the interim beliefs and subsequent optimal choices64
for every player can be viewed as the final output of a solution concept. It is65
thus always possible to compare any given solution concepts in the interim stage66
of a game.67
The two versions of correlated equilibrium can be compared from an ex-ante68
as well as an interim perspective.1 It is well-known that from the ex-ante per-69
spective correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium coincide.70
More precisely, the induced probability measure on choice combinations of a71
correlated equilibrium using the common prior only (and not the players’ infor-72
mation) is equal to some canonical correlated equilibrium, and vice versa. This73
fact together with the consequence that any correlated equilibrium can be repre-74
1 In the ex-post stage of the game the outcome including all players’ choices are
common knowledge. Consequently, a comparison of solution concepts or reasoning
patterns from the ex-post perspective is less insightful.
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sented by some correlated equilibrium distribution is also known as the revelation75
principle. However, the relevant perspective for reasoning and decision-making76
in games seems to be interim. The posterior belief of a player about his op-77
ponents’ choices – conditionalized on his information in the case of correlated78
equilibrium and conditionalized on one of his choices in the case of canonical79
correlated equilibrium – constitute the outcome of the player’s reasoning and80
thus his decision-relevant doxastic mental state. In other words, the players’81
posterior beliefs represent a solution concept doxastically. Optimal choice in line82
with a player’s reasoning then characterizes the respective solution concept be-83
haviourally. An appropriate comparison of solution concepts in terms of their84
game-theoretic semantics thus needs to address these two – doxastic and be-85
havioural – dimensions.86
Here, we show that correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilib-87
rium are neither doxastically nor behaviourally equivalent in the interim stage88
of a game. Thus, the revelation principle even though valid from the ex-ante89
perspective does no longer hold from the interim perspective. First of all, in-90
spired by the game in Aumann and Dreze’s (2008) Figure 2A, we illustrate that91
correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium may induce differ-92
ent sets of first-order beliefs i.e. beliefs about the respective opponents’ choice93
combinations, from an interim perspective. Secondly, we construct an example94
where correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium also differ be-95
haviourally, i.e. in terms of optimal choice. In this sense, correlated equilibrium96
and canonical correlated equilibrium constitute two distinct solution concepts97
for static games.98
In order to conceptually understand the difference of correlated equilibrium99
and canonical correlated equilibrium, a reasoning angle is taken using the stan-100
dard type-based approach. First of all, transformations from Aumann’s epis-101
temic framework to type-based models and back are defined. We show that102
these transformations turn correlated equilibria into epistemic models that sat-103
isfy a common prior assumption as well as contain types expressing common104
5
belief in rationality, and vice versa. An epistemic characterization of correlated105
equilibrium in terms of common belief in rationality and a common prior from106
an interim perspective consequently ensues.107
We then introduce the epistemic condition of one-theory-per-choice. Intu-108
itively, a reasoner satisfying this condition never uses in his entire belief hier-109
archy distinct first-order beliefs to explain the same choice for any player. We110
give an epistemic characterization of canonical correlated equilibrium in terms111
of common belief in rationality, a common prior, and the one-theory-per-choice112
condition from an interim perspective. In terms of reasoning, canonical correlated113
equilibrium thus constitutes a more demanding solution concept than correlated114
equilibrium. Conceptually, the one-theory-per-choice condition contains a cor-115
rect beliefs assumption. Accordingly, the reasoner does not only always explain116
a given choice by the same first-order belief throughout his entire belief hierar-117
chy, but he also believes his opponents to believe he does so, and he believes his118
opponents to believe their opponents to believe he does so, etc. Furthermore,119
the reasoner does not only believe any opponent to explain a given choice by the120
same first-order belief throughout his entire belief hierarchy, but he also believes121
his opponents to believe he does so, and he believes his opponents to believe122
their opponents to believe he does so, etc. In terms of correct beliefs proper-123
ties, canonical correlated equilibrium thus is more demanding than Aumann’s124
original solution concept of correlated equilibrium.125
In applications caution is required which solution concept – correlated equi-126
librium or canonical correlated equilibrium – is used, since they are genuinely127
different in terms of reasoning and the diacritic one-theory-per-choice condition128
does constitute a substantial assumption. In cases where correct beliefs condi-129
tions seem less plausible, correlated equilibrium rather than canonical correlated130
equilibrium appears to be adequate, while in cases where correct beliefs condi-131
tions seem more appropriate, the latter rather than the former solution concept132
appears to be suitable. Importantly, note that the interpretation of our charac-133
terizations of correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium does134
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not imply that one of the two solution concepts qualifies as superior, but that135
they can be concluded to be non-trivially distinct and the one-theory-per-choice136
condition sheds conceptual light on this difference in terms of reasoning.137
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, the two definitions of correlated equilib-138
rium within the framework of static games are recalled. It is then shown in Sec-139
tion 3 that the two solution concepts are neither doxastically nor behaviourally140
equivalent in the interim stage. In Section 4, a reasoning framework by means141
of type-based epistemic models is presented which is later used to analyze corre-142
lated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium. Both solution concepts143
are characterized epistemically from the perspective of the interim stage in Sec-144
tion 5 and their difference in terms of reasoning thereby illuminated. Finally,145
some conceptual issues are addressed in Section 6. In particular, a philosophical146
discussion about the relation of the two versions of correlated equilibrium to147
Nash equilibrium based on the epistemic characterization results from Section 5148
is offered.149
2 Preliminaries150
A static game is modelled as a tuple Γ =
(
I, (Ci)i∈I , (Ui)i∈I
)
, where I is a151
finite set of players, Ci denotes player i’s finite choice set, and Ui : ×j∈ICj → R152
is player i’s utility function, which assigns a real number Ui(c) to every choice153
combination c ∈ ×j∈ICj . For the class of static games the solution concept of154
correlated equilibrium has been introduced by Aumann (1974) and given an155
epistemic foundation in terms of universal rationality and a common prior from156
an ex-ante perspective by Aumann (1987).2 Loosely speaking, in a correlated157
equilibrium the players’ choices are required to satisfy a best response property158
2 Note that Aumann (1987) actually gives an epistemic characterization of canoni-
cal correlated equilibrium from an ex-ante perspective. However, since correlated
equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium are equivalent from an ex-ante
perspective, Aumann’s (1987) epistemic characterization also applies to correlated
equilibrium.
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given a probability measure on the opponents’ choice combinations derived from159
a common prior via Bayesian updating within some information structure.160
In fact, the notion of correlated equilibrium is embedded in the epistemic161
framework of Aumann models, which describe the players’ knowledge and beliefs162
in terms of information partitions. Formally, an Aumann model of a game Γ is a163
tuple AΓ =
(
Ω, π, (Ii)i∈I , (σi)i∈I
)
, where Ω is a finite set of all possible worlds,164
π ∈ ∆(Ω) is a common prior probability measure on the set of all possible165





> 0 for all ω ∈ Ω, with Ii(ω) denoting the cell of Ii containing ω,167
and σi : Ω → Ci is an Ii-measurable choice function for every player i ∈ I.168
Conceptually, the Ii-measurability of σi ensures that i entertains no uncertainty169
whatsoever about his own choice, i.e. σi(ω
′) = σi(ω) for all ω
′ ∈ Ii(ω). A170
player’s choice is thus constant across a cell from his information partition.171
Formally, the choice induced by a cell Pi ∈ Ii is denoted by σi(Pi) := σi(ω) for172
some ω ∈ Pi. Note that beliefs of players are explicitly expressible in Aumann173
models of games. Indeed, beliefs are obtained via Bayesian conditionalization174
on the common prior given the respective player’s information. More precisely,175
an event E ⊆ Ω consists of possible worlds, and player i’s belief in E at a176












) . For instance,177
given a choice combination s−i := (sj)j∈I\{i} of player i’s opponents, the set178
{ω ∈ Ω : σj(ω) = sj for all j ∈ I \ {i}} denotes the event that i’s opponents179
play according to s−i. In the sequel whenever for a given player i a combination of180
objects for his opponents are considered the following notation is used: if Oj are181
sets for every player j ∈ I, then O−i := ×j∈I\{i}Oj denotes the corresponding182
product set of i’s opponents and o−i := (oj)j∈I\{i} ∈ O−i denotes a combination183
of objects – drawn from Oj for every j ∈ I \ {i} – for i’s opponents.184
Within the framework of Aumann models, the notion of correlated equi-185
librium – sometimes also called objective correlated equilibrium – is formally186
defined as follows.187
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Definition 1. Let Γ be a game, and AΓ an Aumann model of it with choice
functions σi : Ω → Ci for every player i ∈ I. The tuple (σi)i∈I of choice
functions constitutes a correlated equilibrium, if for every player i ∈ I, and























for every choice ci ∈ Ci.188
Intuitively, a choice function tuple constitutes a correlated equilibrium, if for189
every player, the choice function specifies at every world a best response given190
the common prior conditionalized on the player’s information and given the191
opponents’ choice functions. Note that this definition of correlated equilibrium192
corresponds precisely to Aumann’s (1974) original definition. In particular, the193
imposition of the best response property on all worlds also including the ones194
that may lie outside the support of the common prior π occurs in the original195
definition.196
Aumann structures induce for every player a probability measure at every
world about the respective opponents’ choices – typically called first-order belief
– via an appropriate projection of the conditionalized common prior. Given a
game Γ a first-order belief βi ∈ ∆(C−i) of some player i ∈ I is possible in a
correlated equilibrium, if there there exists an Aumann model AΓ of Γ such
that the tuple (σj)j∈I constitutes a correlated equilibrium and with some world
ω̂ ∈ Ω such that
βi(c−i) = π
(
{ω′ ∈ Ii(ω̂) : σ−i(ω′) = c−i} | Ii(ω̂)
)
for all c−i ∈ C−i.197
From a behavioural viewpoint it is ultimately of interest what choices a player
can make given a particular line of reasoning and decision-making fixed by spe-
cific epistemic assumptions or by a specific solution concept. Formally, given a
game Γ a choice c∗i ∈ Ci of some player i ∈ I is optimal in a correlated equi-
librium, if there exists an Aumann model AΓ of Γ such that the tuple (σj)j∈I
9























for all ci ∈ Ci.198
Often, in the literature and in textbooks, the following more direct – and199
simpler – definition of correlated equilibrium is used.200
Definition 2. Let Γ be a game, and ρ ∈ ∆(×i∈ICi) a probability measure on the
players’ choice combinations. The probability measure ρ constitutes a canonical
correlated equilibrium, if for every player i ∈ I, and for every choice ci ∈ Ci of
player i such that ρ(ci) > 0, it is the case that∑
c−i∈C−i
ρ(c−i | ci) · Ui(ci, c−i) ≥
∑
c−i∈C−i
ρ(c−i | ci) · Ui(c′i, c−i)
for every choice c′i ∈ Ci, where ρ(ci) :=
∑





Intuitively, a probability measure on the players’ choice combinations consti-203
tutes a canonical correlated equilibrium, if every choice that receives positive204
probability is optimal given the probability measure conditionalized on the very205
choice itself.206
Also, the solution concept of canonical correlated equilibrium naturally in-
duces for every player a first-order belief for each of his choices via Bayesian
conditionalization. Given a game Γ , a first-order belief βi ∈ ∆(C−i) of some
player i ∈ I is possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium, if there there exists
a canonical correlated equilibrium ρ ∈ ∆(×j∈ICj) and a choice ĉi ∈ Ci of player
i with ρ(ĉi) > 0 such that
βi(c−i) = ρ(c−i | ĉi)
for all c−i ∈ C−i.207
Finally, optimal choice with a canonical correlated equilibrium also needs
to be fixed in order to relate the two definitions of correlated equilibrium be-
haviourally. Formally, given a game Γ , a choice c∗i ∈ Ci of some player i ∈ I is
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optimal in a canonical correlated equilibrium, if there exists a canonical corre-
lated equilibrium ρ ∈ ∆(×j∈ICj) and a choice ĉi ∈ Ci of player i with ρ(ĉi) > 0
such that ∑
c−i∈C−i
ρ(c−i | ĉi) · Ui(c∗i , c−i) ≥
∑
c−i∈C−i
ρ(c−i | ĉi) · Ui(ci, c−i)
for all ci ∈ Ci.208
It is well known that the two solution concepts of correlated equilibrium209
and canonical correlated equilibrium induce the same prior measure on choice210
profiles. For the sake of self-containedness and as an explicit demarcation to our211
results a statement and proof of the so-called revelation principle is provided.212
Theorem 1 (“Revelation Principle”). Let Γ be a static game.213
(i) If AΓ is an Aumann model of Γ such that (σi)i∈I constitutes a correlated214






{ω ∈ Ω : σi(ω) =215
ci for all i ∈ I}
)
for all (ci)i∈I ∈ ×i∈ICi, constitutes a canonical correlated216
equilibrium.217
218
(ii) If ρ ∈ ∆(×i∈ICi) constitutes a canonical correlated equilibrium, then there219







ω ∈ Ω as well as (σi)i∈I constitutes a correlated equilibrium.221
Proof. For part (i) of the theorem, let i ∈ I be some player and ci ∈ Ci be some
choice of player i such that ρ(ci) > 0. Then,
ρ(c−i | ci) =
π
(












































ω∈P̂i:σj(ω)=cj for all j∈I\{i}
π(ω | P̂i)
holds for all c−i ∈ C−i. Since (σi)i∈I constitutes a correlated equilibrium, it
follows that ∑
c−i∈C−i













































ρ(c−i | ci) · Ui(c′i, c−i)
for all c′i ∈ Ci. Consequently, ρ constitutes a canonical correlated equilibrium.222
For part (ii) of the theorem, construct an Aumann model AΓ with Ω :=




> 0}, Ij :=
{
{ω(cj ,c−j) ∈ Ω :
c−j ∈ C−j} : cj ∈ Cj with ρ(cj) > 0
}









all ω(cj)j∈I ∈ Ω, and σj(ω(ck)k∈I ) = cj for all ω(ck)k∈I ∈ Ω and for all j ∈ I.3






for all ω ∈ Ω. As














ρ(c−i | ĉi) · Ui(ĉi, c−i) ≥
∑
c−i∈C−i












holds for every choice c′i ∈ Ci and for every player i ∈ I, i.e. (σi)i∈I constitutes223
a correlated equilibrium. 224
3 Note that the possible worlds are indexed with the players’ choice profiles; thus for
every choice combination in Γ there is a corresponding possible world in the Aumann
model AΓ , and vice versa.
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The essential intuition underlying Theorem 1 about the relation of the two ver-225
sions of correlated equilibrium could be grasped as follows. For part (i), since the226
possible worlds inducing ci via σi form a union of cells from Ii, the inequality227
in Definition 1 requires ci to be a best response for every cell of Ii, while the in-228
equality in Definition 2 only needs ci to satisfy the best response property for the229
union of cells inducing ci. Since the latter requirement is weaker than the former,230
a canonical correlated equilibrium ensues based on a correlated equilibrium. For231
part (ii), the sparser embedding of canonical correlated equilibrium is mimicked232
in the potentially richer structure of correlated equilibrium by constructing the233
“canonical” Aumann model. The best response property of canonical correlated234
equilibrium then directly carries over and yields the correlated equilibrium.235
Importantly, the revelation principle (Theorem 1) exclusively relates the two236
versions of correlated equilibrium from the ex-ante perspective before any infor-237
mation has been received and processed by the players. Formally, the compared238
objects π and ρ are prior probability measures. Theorem 1 thus establishes the239
equivalence of correlated equilibrium and canonical equilibrium in the ex-ante240
stage of games.241
3 Difference of the Two Definitions242
With two prevalent notions of correlated equilibrium in the literature that induce243
the same prior measure about choice profiles in games, the natural question244
emerges whether they are also equivalent or not from an interim perspective.245
In other words, it can be investigated whether the revelation principle is robust246
across the different stages of the game. From the interim perspective players have247
processed all information and formed their decision-relevant beliefs upon which248
they will subsequently base their choices. The two solution concepts can thus be249
compared doxastically as well as behaviourally after information processing.250
Suppose that a first-order belief βi ∈ ∆(C−i) is possible in a canonical cor-251
related equilibrium of some game Γ , i.e. βi(c−i) = ρ(c−i | ĉi) for all c−i ∈ C−i252
for some canonical correlated equilibrium ρ ∈ ∆(×j∈ICj) of Γ and for some253
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choice ĉi ∈ Ci with ρ(ĉi) > 0. Consider the constructed Aumann model AΓ254
in the proof of part (ii) of Theorem 1, where (σj)j∈I constitutes a correlated255















. Consequently, the following remark obtains.257
Remark 1. Let Γ be a static game, i ∈ I some player, and β∗i ∈ ∆(C−i) some258
first-order belief of player i. If β∗i is possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium,259
then β∗i is possible in a correlated equilibrium.260
The definition of optimal choice in a solution concept together with Remark261
1 directly implies that optimality in a canonical correlated equilibrium implies262
optimality in a correlated equilibrium.263
Remark 2. Let Γ be a static game, i ∈ I some player, and c∗i ∈ Ci some choice of264
player i. If c∗i is optimal in a canonical correlated equilibrium, then c
∗
i is optimal265
in a correlated equilibrium.266
However, it is now shown by means of an example that the converse of Remark267
1 does not hold.268
Example 1. Consider the two player game between Rowena and Colin depicted269
in Figure 1, which is due to Aumann and Dreze (2008, Figure 2A).4270
Let
(
Ω, π, (Ii)i∈I , (σi)i∈I
)
be an Aumann model of the game, where271
– I = {Rowena,Colin},272
– Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, ω5, ω6, ω7},273
– π ∈ ∆(Ω) with π(ω1) = π(ω3) = 112 and π(ω) =
1
6 for all ω ∈ Ω \ {ω1, ω3},274
– IRowena =
{
{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}, {ω4, ω5}, {ω6, ω7}
}
,275
4 In fact, Aumann and Dreze (2008) use the game depicted in Figure 1 to show that
Rowena’s expected payoff in a canonical correlated equilibrium can be different if
the game is doubled in the sense that each of her choices are listed twice. The game
is thus changed but only the solution concept of canonical correlated equilibrium is
considered. Here, we keep the game fixed, but switch between the solution concepts





T 0, 0 4, 5 5, 4
M 5, 4 0, 0 4, 5
B 4, 5 5, 4 0, 0
Fig. 1. A two player static game between Rowena and Colin.
– IColin =
{
{ω1, ω3, ω5}, {ω2, ω7}, {ω4, ω6}
}
,276
– σRowena(ω1) = σRowena(ω2) = σRowena(ω3) = T , σRowena(ω4) = σRowena(ω5) =277
M , and σRowena(ω6) = σRowena(ω7) = B,278
– σColin(ω1) = σColin(ω3) = σColin(ω5) = R, σColin(ω2) = σColin(ω7) = C,279
and σColin(ω4) = σColin(ω6) = L.280
Observe that (σi)i∈I constitutes a correlated equilibrium of the game. Also, the281
first-order belief β∗Rowena ∈ ∆(CColin) of Rowena such that β∗Rowena(R) = 1 is282
possible in a correlated equilibrium, as IRowena(ω1) = {ω1} and σColin(ω1) = R.283
Suppose that there exists a canonical correlated equilibrium ρ ∈ ∆(CRowena×284
CColin) with ρ(· | cRowena) = β∗Rowena for some cRowena ∈ CRowena such that285
ρ(cRowena) > 0. Since cRowena is optimal for ρ(· | cRowena) = β∗Rowena, it is286
the case that cRowena = T . Hence, ρ(· | T ) = β∗Rowena and thus ρ(R | T ) = 1.287
Consequently, ρ(T,R) > 0 as well as ρ(T, L) = ρ(T,C) = 0. Then, ρ(M,C) =288
ρ(B,C) = 0, as otherwise C is strictly dominated by L on {M,B}, contradicting289
the optimality of C given ρ(· | C) ∈ ∆({M,B}). Then, ρ(B,L) = ρ(B,R) = 0, as290
otherwise B is strictly dominated by M on {L,R}, contradicting the optimality291
of B given ρ(· | B) ∈ ∆({L,R}). Then, ρ(M,L) = 0, as otherwise L is strictly292
dominated by R on {M}, contradicting the optimality of L given ρ(· | L) ∈293
∆({M}). Then, ρ(M,R) = 0, as otherwise M is strictly dominated by T on294
{R}, contradicting the optimality of M given ρ(· | M) ∈ ∆({R}). Therefore,295
it is the case that ρ(T,R) = 1. However, R is not optimal given ρ(· | R), a296
contradiction. Hence, the first-order belief β∗Rowena ∈ ∆(CColin) of Rowena such297
that β∗Rowena(R) = 1 is not possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium. ♣298
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The preceding example establishes the following remark.299
Remark 3. There exists a game Γ , a player i ∈ I, and a first-order belief β∗i ∈300
∆(C−i) of player i such that β
∗
i is possible in a correlated equilibrium but β
∗
i is301
not possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium.302
Intuitively, the difference established by Remark 3 is due to the richer structure303
of correlated equilibrium in terms of Aumann models potentially allowing for304
more first-order beliefs than canonical correlated equilibrium. Consider some305
choice ci ∈ Ci of player i with ρ(ci) > 0. For every cell Pi ∈ Ii such that306
σi(Pi) = ci there could basically exist a distinct corresponding first-order beliefs307
π(· | Pi). However, with the probability measure ρ the unique first-order belief308
corresponding to ci is given by ρ(· | ci). The only link between these two first-309
order beliefs consists in the latter being a convex combination of the former, as310
ci under canonical correlated equilibrium is equivalent to the union of the cells311
inducing ci under correlated equilibrium.312
Actually, in Example 1 the induced optimal choices are equal for both solution313
concepts despite their difference in terms of possible first-order beliefs. Indeed,314
observe that ρ ∈ ∆(CRowena×CColin) with ρ(c) = 19 for all c ∈ CRowena×CColin315
constitutes a canonical correlated equilibrium of the game depicted in Figure 1316
and for every player it is the case that every choice is optimal in ρ. Also, the317
correlated equilibrium (σi)i∈I of this game from Example 1 exhibits the property318
that for every player it is the case that every choice is optimal.319
Yet, both definitions of correlated equilibrium can also be distinct in terms320
of induced optimal choice as the next example shows.321
Example 2. Consider the two player game between Alice and Bob depicted in322
Figure 2.323
Suppose the Aumann model
(
Ω, π, (Ii)i∈I , (σ̂)i∈I
)
of the game, where324
– Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, ω5, ω6, ω7},325
– π(ω1) = π(ω2) = π(ω5) = π(ω6) = π(ω7) =
1
6 and π(ω3) = π(ω4) =
1
12 ,326




e f g h
a 1, 1 2, 3 3, 2 0, 1
b 3, 2 1, 1 2, 3 2, 2
c 2, 3 3, 2 1, 1 1, 3
d 3, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 1
Fig. 2. A two player static game between Alice and Bob.
– IBob = {{ω3, ω4, ω6}, {ω1, ω7}, {ω2, ω5}},328
– σAlice(ω1) = σAlice(ω2) = a, σAlice(ω3) = σAlice(ω4) = σAlice(ω5) = b, and329
σAlice(ω6) = σAlice(ω7) = c,330
– σBob(ω1) = σBob(ω7) = f , σBob(ω2) = σBob(ω5) = g, and σBob(ω3) =331
σBob(ω4) = σBob(ω6) = e.332
Observe that (σAlice, σBob) constitute a correlated equilibrium. Also, the333
choice d of Alice – even though d /∈ supp(σAlice) – is optimal in the correlated334
equilibrium (σAlice, σBob), since d is optimal for Alice at world ω3.335
However, it is now shown that d cannot be optimal in a canonical corre-336
lated equilibrium. Towards a contradiction, suppose that there exists a canoni-337
cal correlated equilibrium ρ ∈ ∆(CAlice × CBob), for which d is optimal. Then,338
ρ(e | c1) = 1 for some choice c1 ∈ CAlice with ρ(c1) > 0, as otherwise c would339
be strictly better than d for Alice. Since c1 needs to be optimal for ρ(· | c1), it340
must be the case that c1 = b or c1 = d.341
Suppose that c1 = d. Then, ρ(e | d) = 1 implies that ρ(e) > 0, which in turn342
implies that e is optimal for ρ(· | e). As ρ(d | e) > 0, the choice h is thus better343
than e, a contradiction.344
Alternatively, suppose that c1 = b, and thus ρ(e | b) = 1. It has to be the345
case that ρ(d) = 0, as otherwise d is optimal for ρ(· | d), hence ρ(e | d) = 1, a346
contradiction. Because ρ(d) = 0 and ρ(e | b) = 1, it follows that ρ(b, g) = 0 as well347
as ρ(d, g) = 0. Therefore, ρ(b | g) = ρ(d | g) = 0 if ρ(g) > 0. Yet, if ρ(g) > 0, then348
f is better than g against ρ(· | g), because in that case ρ(b | g) = ρ(d | g) = 0.349
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This is a contradiction, and thus ρ(g) = 0. Consequently, if ρ(a) > 0, then350
ρ(g | a) = 0, and thus c is better than a against ρ(· | a), a contradiction, hence351
ρ(a) = 0.352
Since ρ(a) = ρ(d) = 0 as well as ρ(e | b) = 1, it is the case that ρ(a, f) =353
ρ(d, f) = ρ(b, f) = 0, and therefore ρ(c | f) = 1 if ρ(f) > 0 . But then, if354
ρ(f) > 0, the choice e is better than f against ρ(· | f), a contradiction, and thus355
ρ(f) = 0.356
As ρ(f) = ρ(g) = 0, it is the case that ρ(f | c) = ρ(g | c) = 0 if ρ(c) > 0.357
Hence, if ρ(c) > 0, the choice b is better than c against ρ(· | c), a contradiction,358
and thus ρ(c) = 0.359
Since ρ(a) = ρ(c) = ρ(d) = 0 as well as ρ(e | b) = 1, it is the case that360
ρ(b, e) = 1. But then ρ(b | e) = 1, and thus g is better than e against ρ(· | e), a361
contradiction.362
Consequently, there exists no canonical correlated equilibrium for which d is363
optimal. ♣364
Thus, the following remark ensues.365
Remark 4. There exists a game Γ , some player i ∈ I, and some choice c∗i ∈ Ci of366
player i such that c∗i is optimal in a correlated equilibrium but c
∗
i is not optimal367
in a canonical correlated equilibrium.368
Intuitively, since correlated equilibrium admits more first-order beliefs than canon-369
ical correlated equilibrium, the resulting flexibility for supporting beliefs results370
in more choices being optimal in the former solution concept than in the latter.371
Due to Remarks 3 and 4 correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated372
equilibrium differ both doxastically as well as behaviourally. Hence, the two373
notions actually constitute genuinely distinct solution concepts for static games.374
4 Epistemic Models375
Reasoning in games is usually modelled by belief hierarchies about the underlying376
space of uncertainty. Due to Harsanyi (1967-68) types can be used as implicit377
18
representations of belief hierarchies. The notion of an epistemic model provides378
the framework to formally describe reasoning in games.379
Definition 3. Let Γ be a static game. An epistemic model of Γ is a tupleMΓ =380 (
(Ti)i∈I , (bi)i∈I
)
, where for every player i ∈ I381
– Ti is a finite set of types,382
– bi : Ti → ∆(C−i × T−i) assigns to every type ti ∈ Ti a probability measure383
bi[ti] on the set of opponents’ choice type combinations.384
Given a game and an epistemic model of it, belief hierarchies, marginal beliefs, as385
well as marginal belief hierarchies can be derived from every type. For instance,386
every type ti ∈ Ti induces a belief on the opponents’ choice combinations by387
marginalizing the probability measure bi[ti] on the space C−i. Note that no388
additional notation is introduced for marginal beliefs, in order to keep notation389
as sparse as possible. It should always be clear from the context which belief390
bi[ti] refers to.391
Besides, we follow a one-player perspective approach, which considers game392
theory as an interactive extension of decision theory. Accordingly, all epistemic393
concepts – including iterated ones – are defined as mental states inside the mind394
of a single person. A one-player approach seems natural in the sense that reason-395
ing is formally represented by epistemic concepts and any reasoning process prior396
to choice does indeed take place entirely within the reasoner’s mind. Formally,397
this approach is parsimonious in the sense that states, describing the beliefs of398
all players, do not have to be invoked in epistemic models of games.399
Some further notions and notation are now introduced. For that purpose400
consider a game Γ , an epistemic model MΓ of it, and fix two players i, j ∈ I401
such that i 6= j.402
A type ti ∈ Ti is said to deem possible some choice type combination (c−i, t−i)403
of his opponents, if bi[ti] assigns positive probability to (c−i, t−i). Analogously, a404
type ti ∈ Ti deems possible some opponent type tj ∈ Tj , if bi[ti] assigns positive405
probability to tj .406
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bi[ti](c−i) · Ui(ci, c−i)
)
.
Intuitively, the common prior assumption in economics states that every407
belief in models with multiple agents is derived from a single probability distri-408
bution, the so-called common prior. In the epistemic framework of Definition 3409
all beliefs are furnished by the types. The common prior assumption thus im-410
poses a condition on the types, requiring all beliefs to be derived from a single411
probability distribution on the basic space of uncertainty and the players’ types.412
Definition 4. Let Γ be a static game, and MΓ an epistemic model of it. The
epistemic model MΓ satisfies the common prior assumption, if there exists a




such that for every player i ∈ I, and
for every type ti ∈ Ti it is the case that ϕ(ti) > 0 and
bi[ti](c−i, t−i) =
ϕ(ci, c−i, ti, t−i)
ϕ(ci, ti)
for all ci ∈ Ci with ϕ(ci, ti) > 0, and for all (c−i, t−i) ∈ C−i×T−i, where ϕ(ti) :=413 ∑
t−i∈T−i
∑




c−i∈C−i ϕ(ci, c−i, ti, t−i).414
The probability measure ϕ is called common prior.415
Accordingly, every type’s induced belief function obtains from a single probabil-416
ity measure – the common prior – via Bayesian updating. Note that the common417
prior is defined on the full space of uncertainty, i.e. on the set of all the play-418
ers’ choice type combinations, while belief functions are defined on the space of419
respective opponents’ choice type combinations only. The common prior assump-420
tion could be interpreted by means of an interim stage set-up, in which every421
player i ∈ I observes the pair (ci, ti) on which he then conditionalizes. Moreover,422
note that our common prior assumption according to Definition 4 is equivalent423
to the conjunction of Dekel and Siniscalchi’s (2015) Definition 12.13 with their424
Definition 12.15. In a sense, the common prior assumption is commonly believed425
by the players in an epistemic model satisfying it, as every type of ever player426
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believes that all types in the epistemic model derive their beliefs from the same427
prior.428
Intuitively, an optimal choice yields at least as much payoff as all other op-
tions, given what the player believes his opponents to choose. Formally, optimal-
ity is a property of choices given a type. A choice c∗i ∈ Ci is said to be optimal
for the type ti, if
ui(c
∗
i , ti) ≥ ui(ci, ti)
for all ci ∈ Ci.429
A player believes in rationality, if he only deems possible choice type pairs –430
for each of his opponents – such that the choice is optimal for the respective type.431
Formally, a type ti ∈ Ti is said to believe in rationality, if ti only deems possible432
choice type combinations (c−i, t−i) ∈ C−i×T−i such that cj is optimal for tj for433
every opponent j ∈ I \{i}. Note that belief in rationality imposes restrictions on434
the first two layers of a player’s belief hierarchy, since the player’s belief about435
his opponents’ choices as well as the player’s belief about his opponents’ beliefs436
about their respective opponents’ choices are affected.437
The conditions on interactive reasoning can be taken to further – arbitrarily438
high – layers in belief hierarchies.439
Definition 5. Let Γ be a static game, MΓ an epistemic model of it, and i ∈ I440
some player.441
– A type ti ∈ Ti expresses 1-fold belief in rationality, if ti believes in rationality.442
– A type ti ∈ Ti expresses k-fold belief in rationality for some k > 1, if ti443
only deems possible types tj ∈ Tj for all j ∈ I \ {i} such that tj expresses444
k − 1-fold belief in rationality.445
– A type ti ∈ Ti expresses common belief in rationality, if ti expresses k-fold446
belief in rationality for all k ≥ 1.447
A player satisfying common belief in rationality entertains a belief hierarchy448
in which the rationality of all players is not questioned at any level. Observe449
that if an epistemic model for every player only contains types that believe450
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in rationality, then every type also expresses common belief in rationality. This451
fact is useful when constructing epistemic models with types expressing common452
belief in rationality.453
Consider two players i ∈ I and j ∈ I not necessarily distinct. A type tj of454
player j is called belief-reachable from a type ti of player i, if there exists a finite455
sequence (t1, . . . , tN ) of types with N ∈ N, where tn+1 ∈ supp(bk[tn]) such that456
tn ∈ Tk for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, and t1 = ti as well as tN = tj . Intuitively,457
if a type tj is belief-reachable from a type ti, the former is not excluded in the458
interactive reasoning by the latter. The set Tj(ti) contains all belief-reachable459
types of player j from ti. Similarly, a choice type pair (cj , tj) ∈ Cj × Tj is called460
belief-reachable from ti, if there exists a finite sequence (t
1, . . . , tN ) of types461
with N ∈ N, where tn+1 ∈ supp(bk[tn]) for some k ∈ I such that tn ∈ Tk for462
all n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, t1 = ti as well as tN = tj , and bk(tN−1)(cj , tj) > 0.463
The set of belief-reachable choice type pairs of player j from ti is denoted by464
(Cj × Tj)(ti). Intuitively, if a choice type pair (cj , tj) is belief-reachable from a465
type ti, the former is not excluded in the interactive reasoning by the latter.466
The following lemma ensures that belief reachability preserves common belief467
in rationality.468
Lemma 1. Let Γ be a static game, MΓ an epistemic model of it, i, j ∈ I some469
players, ti ∈ Ti a type of player i, and tj ∈ Tj a type of player j. If ti expresses470
common belief in rationality and tj is belief reachable from ti, then tj expresses471
common belief in rationality.472
Proof. Assume that tj is belief reachable from ti in N > 1 steps, i.e. there exists473
a finite sequence (t1, . . . , tN ) of types with tn+1 ∈ supp(bk[tn]) as well as t1 = ti474
and tN = tj . Towards a contradiction suppose that tj does not express common475
belief in rationality. Then, there exists k > 0 such that tj does not express k-fold476
belief in rationality. However, as ti deems possible tj at the N -level of its induced477
belief hierarchy, ti thus violates (N + k)-fold belief in rationality and a fortiori478
common belief in rationality, a contradiction. 479
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The choice rule of rationality and the reasoning concept of common belief480
in rationality give rational choice under common belief in rationality. More pre-481
cisely, a choice c∗i ∈ Ci is said to be rational under common belief in rationality,482
if there exists an epistemic modelMΓ of Γ with a type ti ∈ Ti of i such that c∗i483
is optimal for ti and ti expresses common belief in rationality. Similarly, a choice484
c∗i ∈ Ci is said to be rational under common belief in rationality with a common485
prior, if there exists an epistemic model MΓ of Γ satisfying the common prior486
assumption with a type ti ∈ Ti of i such that c∗i is optimal for ti and ti expresses487
common belief in rationality. Besides, a first-order belief β∗i ∈ ∆(C−i) is said488
to be possible under common belief in rationality with a common prior, if there489
exists an epistemic model MΓ of Γ satisfying the common prior assumption490
with a type ti ∈ Ti of i such that bi[ti](c−i) = β∗i (c−i) for all c−i ∈ C−i and ti491
expresses common belief in rationality492
5 Epistemic Comparison of the Two Definitions493
Before the two solution concepts of correlated equilibrium and canonical cor-494
related equilibrium are contrasted epistemically, the structural relationship be-495
tween Aumann models and epistemic models is investigated.496
On the one hand, epistemic models can be derived from Aumann models as497
follows.498
Definition 6. Let Γ be a static game, and AΓ an Aumann model of Γ . For499
every player i ∈ I, construct a set Ti := {tPii : Pi ∈ Ii}, a function ηi : Ω → Ti500
such that ηi(ω) = t
Ii(ω)
i for all ω ∈ Ω, a function bi : Ti → ∆(C−i × T−i) such501
that bi[t
Pi
i ](c−i, t−i) =
∑
ω∈Pi:σ−i(ω)=c−i,η−i(ω)=t−i π(ω | Pi) for all (c−i, t−i) ∈502
C−i × T−i and for all tPii ∈ Ti. The epistemic model η(AΓ ) of Γ thus obtained503
is called the AΓ -induced epistemic model of Γ .504
Accordingly, based on an Aumann model the functions ηi for every player i ∈ I505
provide the ingredients for an epistemic model. In particular, these epistemic506
models satisfy the common prior assumption as will – among other things – be507
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shown below in Theorem 2. Besides, the notation tPii labels the types in the508
induced epistemic model with the player’s information cells from the Aumann509
model. Thus, by construction, for every cell there exists a type, and vica versa.510
Conversely, epistemic models with a common prior also induce Aumann mod-511
els.512
Definition 7. Let Γ be a static game, and MΓ an epistemic model of Γ satis-513
fying the common prior assumption with common prior ϕ. Construct a set Ω :=514




> 0}, a function515








for all ω(ci,ti)i∈I ∈ Ω, as well516














−i) ∈ Ω : c′−i ∈ C−i, t′−i ∈ T−i} for all ω(cj ,tj)j∈I ∈ Ω. The Aumann519
model θ(MΓ ) of Γ thus obtained is called the MΓ -induced Aumann model of520
Γ .521
In terms of notation a possible world ω(citi)i∈I in the induced Aumann model522
is labelled by a combination of players’ choices and types from the epistemic523
model. This construction ensures that there exists a possible world for every524
combination of players’ choices and types, and vice versa.525
Note that given some game Γ , the structure η(AΓ ) can be expressed as the526
image of a function from the collection of all Aumann models of Γ as domain527
to the collection of all epistemic models of Γ as range, and the structure θ(MΓ )528
can be expressed as the image of a function from the collection of all epistemic529
models for Γ satisfying the common prior assumption as domain to the collection530
of all Aumann models of Γ as range.531
It is now shown that the transformations between Aumann models and epis-532
temic models connect correlated equilibrium with common belief in rationality533
and a common prior.534
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a static game.535
(i) Let AΓ be an Aumann model of Γ , and η(AΓ ) be the AΓ -induced epis-536
temic model of Γ . If (σi)i∈I in AΓ constitutes a correlated equilibrium, then537
24
all types in η(AΓ ) express common belief in rationality and η(AΓ ) satisfies538
the common prior assumption.539
540
(ii) Let MΓ be an epistemic model of Γ satisfying the common prior assump-541
tion, and θ(MΓ ) be the MΓ -induced Aumann model of Γ . If all types in542
MΓ express common belief in rationality, then (σi)i∈I in θ(MΓ ) constitutes543
a correlated equilibrium.544
Proof. For part (i) of the theorem, let ω ∈ Ω be some world and tIi(ω)i some
type of some player i ∈ I. Consider some player j ∈ I \{i} and some choice type
pair (cj , tj) ∈ Cj × Tj of player j such that bi[tIi(ω)i ](cj , tj) > 0. As
bi[t
Ii(ω)










there exists a world ω′ ∈ Ii(ω) such that π(ω′) > 0, σ−i(ω′) = c−i, and tI−i(ω
′)
−i =545
t−i. Since (σk)k∈I constitutes a correlated equilibrium, σj(ω
′) = cj is optimal546
for j’s first-order belief at ω′ which is the same as t
Ij(ω′)
j ’s first-order belief by547
construction of η(AΓ ). Because tIj(ω
′)
j = tj , the choice cj is optimal for tj ’s548
first-order belief and t
Ii(ω)
i thus believes in j’s rationality. As t
Ii(ω)
i as well as549
t
Ij(ω′)
j have been chosen arbitrarily, all types in η(AΓ ) believe in rationality, and550
consequently express common belief in rationality too.551
Define a a probability measure ϕ ∈ ∆
(
×j∈I (Cj × Tj)
)
such that for all
(cj , t
Pj








π(∩j∈IPj), if cj = σj(Pj) for all j ∈ I,0, otherwise.
It is now shown that η(AΓ ) satisfies the common prior assumption, by estab-
lishing that for all j ∈ I and tPjj ∈ Tj , it is the case that
bj [t
Pj


















for all cj ∈ Cj with ϕ(cj , t
Pj
j ) > 0, and for all (c−j , t
P−j
−j ) ∈ C−j×T−j . Note that
ϕ(cj , t
Pj
j ) > 0 only holds if cj = σj(Pj). It thus has to be established that
bj [t
Pj



















for all (c−j , t
P−j
−j ) ∈ C−j × T−j and for all t
Pj
j ∈ Tj . Consider some Pj ∈ Ij and552
distinguish two cases (I) and (II).553
Case (I). Suppose that Pj ∩ (∩k∈I\{j}Pk) 6= ∅ and ck = σk(Pk) for all k ∈
I \ {j}. Observe that
bj [t
Pj
j ](c−j , t
P−j

















































































Case (II). Suppose that Pj ∩ (∩k∈I\{j}Pk) = ∅ or ck 6= σk(Pk) for some
k ∈ I \ {j}. Then,
bj [t
Pj
j ](c−j , t
P−j















holds by definition. Hence, η(AΓ ) satisfies the common prior assumption.554
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For part (ii) of the theorem, let (cj , tj)j∈I ∈ ×j∈I(Cj × Tj) be some choice




> 0. Consider the world

















































where the third equality follows from the fact thatMΓ satisfies the common prior
assumption with common prior ϕ. Now, consider some world ω(cj ,tj)j∈I ∈ Ω
and some player i ∈ I. Since ϕ(ci, ti) > 0, there exists a type tj ∈ Tj such
that bj [tj ](ci, ti) > 0 for some player j ∈ I. As tj expresses common belief in
rationality, tj believes in i’s rationality. Hence
ui(ci, ti) ≥ ui(c′i, ti)


























































holds for all c′i ∈ Ci, and thus (σi)i∈I constitutes a correlated equilibrium. 555
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In fact, Theorem 2 can be interpreted as a morphism between Aumann models556
and epistemic models that preserves some notions of optimality of choice and557
common prior.558
An epistemic characterization of correlated equilibrium in terms of common559
belief in rationality and a common prior ensues as follows.560
Theorem 3. Let Γ be a static game, i ∈ I some player, β∗i ∈ ∆(C−i) some561
first-order belief of player i, and c∗i ∈ Ci some choice of player i.562
(i) The first-order belief β∗i is possible in a correlated equilibrium, if and only563
if, the first-order belief β∗i is possible under common belief in rationality with564
a common prior.565
566
(ii) The choice c∗i is optimal in a correlated equilibrium, if and only if, the567
choice c∗i is rational under common belief in rationality with a common prior.568
Proof. For the only if direction of part (i) of the theorem, let AΓ be an Au-569
mann model of Γ and (σj)j∈I a correlated equilibrium, in which β
∗
i is possi-570
ble. Then, there exists a world ω̂ ∈ Ω such that β∗i (c−i) = π
(
{ω′ ∈ Ii(ω̂) :571
σ−i(ω
′) = c−i} | Ii(ω̂)
)
for all c−i ∈ C−i. Consider the epistemic model η(AΓ )572
of Γ . By Theorem 2 (i), the type t
Ii(ω̂)
i expresses common belief in rationality,573
and the epistemic model η(AΓ ) of Γ satisfies the common prior assumption.574
Note that bi[t
Ii(ω̂)







all (c−i, t−i) ∈ C−i × T−i, and thus β∗i (c−i) = bi[t
Ii(ω̂)
i ](c−i) for all c−i ∈ C−i.576
Therefore, the first-order belief β∗i is possible under common belief in rationality577
with a common prior.578
For the if direction of the part (i) of the theorem, suppose that β∗i is pos-579
sible under common belief in rationality with a common prior. Thus, there580
exists an epistemic model MΓ of Γ with a type t∗i ∈ Ti such that t∗i ex-581
presses common belief in rationality, bi[t
∗
i ](c−i) = β
∗
i (c−i) for all c−i ∈ C−i,582
and MΓ satisfies the common prior assumption. Construct an epistemic model583
(MΓ )′ =
(




of Γ , where for every player j ∈ I, the set T ′j of584
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types contains those tj ∈ Tj from MΓ such that tj ∈ Tj(t∗i ), i.e. tj is belief-585
reachable from t∗i . Note that (MΓ )′ satisfies the common prior assumption,586
with common prior ϕ′ ∈ ∆
(
×j∈I (Cj × T ′j)
)
being ϕ ∈ ∆
(
×j∈I (Cj × Tj)
)
587
from MΓ restricted to, and normalized on, ×j∈I(Cj × T ′j). By Lemma 1, all588
types in (MΓ )′ express common belief in rationality. It then follows with The-589





the first-order beliefs of t∗i are the same in (MΓ ) and (MΓ )′, the first-order591
belief of t∗i equals β
∗
i also in (MΓ )′. Consider a world ω(ci,t
∗
i ,c−i,t−i) ∈ Ω592
with ϕ′(ci, t
∗
i , c−i, t−i) > 0 for some ci ∈ Ci, c−i ∈ C−i, and t−i ∈ T−i.593




t−i∈T−i ϕ(c−i, t−i | ci, t
∗



















. Therefore, β∗i is possi-595
ble in a correlated equilibrium.596
For part (ii) of the theorem, let AΓ be an Aumann model of Γ and (σj)j∈I a597
correlated equilibrium, in which c∗i is optimal. Then, there exists some first-order598
belief β∗i ∈ ∆(C−i) possible in AΓ for which c∗i maximizes expected utility. By599
part (i) of the corollary it then follows that β∗i is also possible under common600
belief in rationality with a common prior, and consequently c∗i is optimal under601
common belief in rationality with a common prior too. Conversely, letMΓ be an602
epistemic model of Γ with a type t∗i ∈ Ti such that t∗i expresses common belief in603
rationality, c∗i is optimal for t
∗
i , andMΓ satisfies the common prior assumption.604
Let β∗i ∈ ∆(Ci) be the first-order belief of t∗i . Then, β∗i is possible under common605
belief in rationality with a common prior. By part (i) of the corollary it then606
follows that β∗i is also possible in a correlated equilibrium, and consequently c
∗
i607
is optimal in a correlated equilibrium too. 608
From an epistemic perspective correlated equilibrium is thus – doxastically and609
behaviourally – equivalent to common belief in rationality with a common prior.610
In fact, the epistemic characterization of correlated equilibrium according to611
Theorem 3 somewhat resembles Dekel and Siniscalchi (2015, Theorem 12.4).612
However, the two epistemic characterizations differ importantly in the sense613
that the latter is provided for an ex-ante perspective while the former is fur-614
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nished for an interim perspective. More precisely, Theorem 3 characterizes the615
players’ (conditionalized) first-order beliefs as well as optimal choices in line616
with correlated equilibrium, while Dekel and Sinischalchi (2015, Theorem 12.4)617
focus on the (prior) beliefs corresponding to Aumann’s original solution concept.618
Furthermore, a minor difference lies in the formulation of the epistemic charac-619
terization in terms of belief hierarchies (Dekel and Siniscalchi, 2015, Theorem620
12.4) as opposed to types (Theorem 3). Note that the conditions used by Dekel621
and Sinischalchi (2015, Theorem 12.4) as well as by Theorem 3 are weaker than622
in Aumann (1987), where correlated equilibrium is characterized – also from an623
ex-ante in contrast to our interim perspective – in terms of universal rationality624
and a common prior. More precisely, Aumann (1987) assumes that players are625
rational at all possible worlds, which is stronger than common belief in ratio-626
nality. Intuitively, in Aumann’s (1987) model no irrationality in the system is627
admitted at all. Besides, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) characterize a variant628
of correlated equilibrium without a common prior called a posteriori equilibrium629
by common knowledge of rationality for the ex-ante stage of the game.630
Next canonical correlated equilibrium is considered from an epistemic per-631
spective. Before the solution concept is epistemically characterized, two further632
doxastic conditions are introduced.633
Definition 8. Let Γ be a static game, MΓ an epistemic model of it, i, j ∈ I
two players, ti ∈ Ti some type of player i, βj ∈ ∆(C−j) some first-order belief of
player j, and cj ∈ Cj some choice of player j. The type ti always explains choice
cj by first-order belief βj, if for all tj ∈ Tj such that (cj , tj) ∈ (Cj × Tj)(ti), it
is the case that
bj [tj ](c−j) = βj(c−j)
for all c−j ∈ C−j.634
Accordingly, every given choice deemed possible a reasoner accompanies with635
the same first-order belief in his entire belief hierarchy. In this sense, throughout636
his reasoning any given choice is explained in a unique way.637
30
Requiring a player to always explain any choice with a fixed first-order belief638
gives rise to the notion of one-theory-per-choice, as follows.639
Definition 9. Let Γ be a static game,MΓ an epistemic model of it, i ∈ I some640
player, and ti ∈ Ti some type of player i. The type ti holds one-theory-per-choice,641
if for all j ∈ I, and for all cj ∈ Cj, there exists βj ∈ ∆(C−j) such that ti always642
explains cj by βj.643
Intuitively, a player reasoning in line with one-theory-per-choice never – i.e.644
nowhere in his belief hierarchy – uses distinct first-order beliefs (“theories”) for645
any player to explain the same choice of this player. The reasoner does thus not646
use more theories than necessary in his belief hierarchy, which is in this sense647
sparse. Besides, note that in Example 2 Bob’s belief hierarchy induced at world648
ω3 actually violates the one-theory-per-choice condition. Indeed, Bob believes649
with probability 14 that Alice chooses b while believing him to choose e, but650
he also believes with probability 14 that Alice chooses b while believing him to651
choose e with probability 13 and g with probability
2
3 .652
In fact, the one-theory-per-choice condition contains a rather strong psycho-653
logical assumption in terms of correct beliefs. Since at no iteration in the full654
belief hierarchy of a reasoner holding one-theory-per-choice any given choice is655
coupled with distinct first-order beliefs, the reasoner believes that his opponents656
are correct about how he explains any choice, he believes that his opponents657
believe that their opponents are correct about how he explains any choice, etc.658
Also, the reasoner does not only believe that any opponent only uses a single659
theory to explain a given choice, but also believes that his other opponents be-660
lieve so, and that they believe their opponents to believe so, etc. In particular,661
the following remark thus ensues.662
Remark 5. Let Γ be a static game, MΓ an epistemic model of it, i ∈ I some663
player, and ti ∈ Ti some type of player i that holds one-theory-per-choice. Con-664
sider some player j ∈ I, some choice of player cj ∈ Cj , and some first-order665
belief βj ∈ ∆(C−j) of player j such that ti always explains cj by βj .666
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(i) For all k ∈ I \ {i}, for all tk ∈ Tk such that bi[ti](tk) > 0, and for all t′i ∈ Ti667
such that bk[tk](t
′
i) > 0, it is the case that t
′
i always explains cj by βj .668
669
(ii) For all l ∈ I \ {i, j}, and for all tl ∈ Tl such that bi[ti](tl) > 0, it is the670
case that tl always explains cj by βj .671
Accordingly, the one-theory-per-choice condition thus contains two correct be-672
liefs assumptions: a reasoner believes his opponents to be correct about all of his673
choice explanations as well as projects his choice explanations on any other oppo-674
nent. It is even the case that common belief in these two properties – or formally675
in properties (i) and (ii) of Remark 5 – is implied by one-theory-per-choice, as676
they are taken for certain in all interactive belief iterations.677
Besides, a first-order belief βi ∈ Ci is said to be possible under common belief678
in rationality with a common prior and one-theory-per-choice, if there exists an679
epistemic model MΓ of Γ satisfying the common prior assumption with a type680
t∗i ∈ Ti of i such that bi[t∗i ](c−i) = β∗i (c−i) for all c−i ∈ C−i and t∗i expresses681
common belief in rationality as well as holds one-theory-per-choice. Similarly, a682
choice c∗i ∈ Ci is said to be rational under common belief in rationality with a683
common prior and one-theory-per-choice, if there exists an epistemic modelMΓ684
of Γ satisfying the common prior assumption with a type t∗i ∈ Ti of i such that685




i expresses common belief in rationality as well as holds686
one-theory-per-choice.687
An epistemic characterization of canonical correlated equilibrium then ensues688
as follows.689
Theorem 4. Let Γ be a static game, i ∈ I some player, β∗i ∈ ∆(C−i) some690
first-order belief of player i, and c∗i ∈ Ci some choice of player i.691
(i) The first-order belief β∗i is possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium,692
if and only if, the first-order belief β∗i is possible under common belief in693
rationality with a common prior and one-theory-per-choice.694
695
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(ii) The choice c∗i is optimal in a canonical correlated equilibrium, if and only696
if, the choice c∗i is rational under common belief in rationality with a common697
prior and one-theory-per-choice.698
Proof. For the only if direction of part (i) of the theorem, suppose that ρ ∈
∆(×j∈ICj) constitutes a canonical correlated equilibrium of Γ . For every j ∈ I
define a type space Tj := {t
cj
j : ρ(cj) > 0} with induced belief function
bj [t
cj
j ](c−j , t−j) :=




for every type t
cj














, if tj = t
cj
j for all j ∈ I,
0, otherwise,
















= ρ(c−j | cj) = bj [t
cj
j ](c−j , t
c−j
−j )
holds for all (cj , t
cj
j ) ∈ Cj × Tj , and thus the constructed epistemic model700 (
(Tj)j∈I , (bj)j∈I
)
satisfies the common prior assumption with common prior ϕ.701
Next consider some type t
cj
j ∈ Tj and let (ck, tk), (ck, t′k) ∈ (Ck × Tk)(t
cj
j )702
be belief-reachable from t
cj





thus bk[tk](c−k) = bk[t
′
k](c−k) trivially holds for all c−k ∈ C−k. Therefore, t
cj
j704
holds one-theory-per-choice. As t
cj
j has been chosen arbitrarily, all types in Tj705
hold one-theory-per-choice.706
Furthermore, let (ck, tk) ∈ Ck × Tk such that bj [t
cj
j ](ck, tk) > 0 for some707
t
cj




k ](c−k) = ρ(c−k | ck) holds for all c−k ∈ C−k708
as well as ρ(ck) > 0. Since ρ is a canonical correlated equilibrium, ck is optimal709
for ρ(· | ck) and consequently optimal for tckk too. Hence, all types believe in710
rationality and a fortiori all types express common belief in rationality.711
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Suppose that β∗i is possible in the canonical correlated equilibrium ρ. Then,712
there exists some choice ĉi ∈ Ci with ρ(ĉi) > 0 such that ρ(c−i | ĉi) = β∗i (c−i) for713
all c−i ∈ C−i. Consider the type tĉii ∈ Ti, which indeed exists due to ρ(ĉi) > 0,714
and observe that bi[t
ĉi
i ](c−i) = ρ(c−i | ĉi) = β∗i (c−i) for all c−i ∈ C−i. Therefore,715
the first-order belief β∗i is possible under common belief in rationality with a716
common prior and one-theory-per-choice.717
For the if direction of part (i) of the theorem, let MΓ be an epistemic718
model of Γ that satisfies the common prior assumption with common prior719
ϕ ∈ ∆
(
×j∈I (Cj × Tj)
)
, as well as t∗i ∈ Ti be a type such that t∗i expresses720
common belief in rationality, holds one-theory-per-choice, and t∗i holds first-order721
belief β∗i . It is shown that β
∗
i is possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium.722
Consider some choice type pair (cj , tj) ∈ (Cj × Tj)(t∗i ) of some player j ∈ I723
that is belief-reachable from t∗i . Then, there exists a sequence (t
1, . . . , tN ) of724
types such that t1 = t∗i , t
N = tj , bk[t
n](tn+1) > 0 for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1},725
for some k ∈ I, and bl[tN−1](cj , tj) > 0. As t∗i expresses (N − 1)-fold belief in726
rationality, it directly follows that cj is optimal for tj .727











) , if ck ∈ Ck(t∗i ) for all k ∈ I,
0, otherwise,
for all (ck)k∈I ∈ ×k∈ICk, where Ck(t∗i ) := {ck ∈ Ck : (ck, tk) ∈ (Ck×Tk)(t∗i ) for some tk ∈728
Tk}.729
Let c̃j ∈ Cj be some choice such that ρ(c̃j) > 0. Thus, c̃j ∈ Cj(t∗i ) and there
exists some type t̃j ∈ Tj such that (c̃j , t̃j) ∈ (Cj × Tj)(t∗i ). Since t∗i expresses
common belief in rationality, it follows, that c̃j is optimal for t̃j . AsMΓ satisfies
the common prior assumption, it is the case that
bj [t̃j ](c−j , t−j) =
ϕ(c̃j , t̃j , c−j , t−j)
ϕ(c̃j , t̃j)
holds, and hence
bj [t̃j ](c−j) =
ϕ(c̃j , t̃j , {c−j} × T−j)
ϕ(c̃j , t̃j)
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for all c−j ∈ C−j .730
Since t∗i holds one-theory-per-choice, all types in the set Tj(c̃j) := {t′j ∈
Tj : (c̃j , t
′
j) ∈ (Cj × Tj)(t∗i )} have the same first-order belief βj ∈ ∆(C−j).




ϕ({c̃j , t′j} × {c−j} × T−j)
ϕ(c̃j , t′j)
= βj(c−j)
for all c−j ∈ C−j . Then,























for all c−j ∈ C−j . Thus, t̃j ’s first-order belief is βj = ρ(· | c̃j), and – since c̃j is731
optimal for t̃j – it is the case that c̃j is optimal for ρ(· | c̃j). Therefore, ρ is a732
canonical correlated equilibrium.733
Recall that t∗i holds first-order belief β
∗
i . It is shown that β
∗
i is possible in the734
canonical correlated equilibrium ρ. As ϕ(t∗i ) > 0, andMΓ satisfies the common735
prior assumption, it follows that (c̃i, t
∗
i ) ∈ (Ci × Ti)(t∗i ) for some c̃i ∈ Ci. In736
fact, there exists a player l ∈ I such that bi[t∗i ](tl) > 0 and bl[tl](c̃i, t∗i ) > 0.737
Since t∗i holds one-theory-per-choice, β
∗
i is the unique first-order belief attached738
to c̃i in t
∗
i ’s induced belief hierarchy. As t
∗
i ∈ Ti(c̃i), it follows from above that739
β∗i (c−i) = bi[t
∗
i ](c−i) = ρ(c−i | c̃i) for all c−i ∈ C−i. Consequently, β∗i is possible740
in a canonical correlated equilibrium.741
For part (ii) of the theorem, let ρ be a canonical correlated equilibrium,742
in which c∗i is optimal. Then, there exists some first-order belief β
∗
i ∈ ∆(C−i)743
possible in ρ for which c∗i maximizes expected utility. By part (i) of the theo-744
rem it then follows that β∗i is also possible under common belief in rationality745
with a common prior and one-theory-per-choice, thus c∗i is optimal under com-746
mon belief in rationality with a common prior and one one-theory-per-choice747
too. Conversely, let MΓ be an epistemic model of Γ with a type t∗i ∈ Ti such748




c∗i is optimal for t
∗
i , and MΓ satisfies the common prior assumption. Let β∗i be750
t∗i ’s first-order belief. Then, β
∗
i is possible under common belief in rationality751
with a common prior and one-theory-per-choice. By part (i) of the theorem it752
then follows that β∗i is also possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium, and753
consequently c∗i is optimal in a canonical correlated equilibrium too. 754
From an epistemic perspective the solution concept of canonical correlated equi-755
librium thus is substantially stronger than correlated equilibrium by also requir-756
ing the reasoner’s thinking to be in line with the one-theory-per-choice condition,757
which in turn contains a significant correct beliefs assumption.758
It can be concluded that correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equi-759
librium are distinct solution concepts both behaviourally as well as doxastically.760
The epistemic characterizations via Theorems 3 and 4 shed light on understand-761
ing this difference conceptually. Indeed, canonical correlated equilibrium requires762
a non-trivial correct beliefs property – the one-theory-per-choice condition – in763
addition to common belief in rationality and a common prior also used by corre-764
lated equilibrium. Since a correct beliefs assumption also constitutes the decisive765
reasoning property of Nash equilibrium, canonical correlated equilibrium appears766
to be closer to this solution concept, while correlated equilibrium seems to be767
more distant from it. Also, canonical correlated equilibrium can thus be seen768
as a more demanding solution concept than correlated equilibrium in terms of769
reasoning.770
6 Discussion771
Solution Concepts and Epistemic Conditions. Before our formal results can be772
discussed philosophically, it is important to fix an interpretation of the focal ob-773
jects in general. The relevant objects are the two solution concepts of correlated774
equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium as well as their corresponding775
epistemic conditions. The meaning of solution concepts and epistemic conditions776
thus have to be elaborated on.777
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Solution concepts in game theory are mechanical procedures that give pre-778
dictions about players’ choices. Typically, the input to a solution concept is the779
specification of a game and the output is a subset of all the players’ choice780
combinations. While being based on implicit intuitive ideas, the actual solution781
concept itself takes the shape of a black box. Furthermore, solution concepts782
are not uniformly defined within the same structure. For instance, correlated783
equilibrium is formulated in Aumann models and imposes a property on choice784
functions, whereas canonical correlated equilibrium specifies a property for a785
probability measure on all players’ choice combinations. Consequently, due to786
their opaque character as well as possibly distinct structural embeddings and787
kinds of output, it is delicate to directly interpret solution concepts in a lucid788
way.789
However, it is possible to indirectly furnish meaning to a solution concept790
by characterizing it in terms of reasoning. The formal framework of game forms791
is extended by epistemic models which allow to describe interactive reasoning792
patterns by means of epistemic conditions. The characterization of a solution793
concept with epistemic conditions makes explicit its underlying intuitive ideas794
in a rigorous way. Accordingly, the interpretation of a solution concept is shifted795
to the epistemic realm. The precise interactive thinking that guides players to796
choose in line with a solution concept thus constitutes the latter’s meaning.797
Solution concepts and epistemic conditions thus form a duality. A solution798
concept and its corresponding epistemic conditions are formally equivalent, yet799
the former constitutes a mechanic procedure to compute choice profiles while800
the latter represents interactive reasoning pattern. In a sense, solution concepts801
could be viewed as the syntax and epistemic conditions as the semantics of a802
logic of interactive decision-making.803
Besides, an epistemic model provides a uniform structure in which solution804
concepts can be compared via their corresponding epistemic conditions. Such a805
universal point of reference is especially crucial for perspicuously relating solution806
concepts that are defined in varying formal frameworks or that generate distinct807
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kinds of output. For instance, to determine whether two solution concepts are808
equivalent or not their corresponding epistemic conditions can be juxtaposed.809
Here, this epistemic approach to fathom solution concepts has served to establish810
that the solution concepts of correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated811
equilibrium are semantically distinct and do not correspond to the same lines of812
reasoning.813
Ex-Ante versus Interim. From an ex-ante perspective before any reasoning or814
decision-making takes place, correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated815
equilibrium induce the same probability measures on the players’ choice com-816
binations. This so-called revelation principle is formally expressed by Theorem817
1. Crucially, the ensuing equivalence of correlated equilibrium and canonical818
correlated equilibrium merely applies to the ex-ante stage of the game.819
However, such a prior equivalence is only of limited interest for reasoning820
and decision-making in games. The posterior beliefs and the optimal choices821
in line with these posterior beliefs are the pertinent objects for reasoning and822
decision-making. The two solution concepts have been shown here to differ in823
terms of both their possible posterior beliefs (Remark 3) as well as their optimal824
optimal choices (Remark 4), i.e. in terms of both relevant dimensions significant825
for reasoning and decision-making. The revelation principle does thus no longer826
hold in the interim stage of the game and in this sense fails to be robust.827
Common Belief in Rationality. The one-theory-per-choice condition does not828
have any behavioural effect if imposed in addition to common belief in rational-829
ity only. Intuitively, if a choice is rational under common belief in rationality,830
it is well-known that it then survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated831
choices. It is possible to construct an epistemic model such that there exists a832
single type for every surviving choice. As for every choice there then exists a833
unique supporting type, belief in rationality already requires a unique way of834
coupling opponents’ choices and types in the support of a given player’s induced835
belief function. Consequently, the one-theory-per-choice condition holds in such836
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an epistemic model. Therefore, a choice is rational under common belief in ra-837
tionality, if and only if, it is rational under common belief in rationality with838
one-theory-per-choice.839
Thus, the one-theory-per-choice-condition does not add anything in terms of840
optimal choice to common belief in rationality. Only if a common prior is also841
assumed the one-theory-per-choice condition exhibits behavioural implications842
beyond common belief in rationality resulting in canonical correlated equilibrium843
and not in iterated elimination of strictly dominated choices. Remark 5 also844
distinguishes the one-theory-per-choice condition from simple belief hierarchies.845
Indeed, the assumption of simple belief hierarchies in conjunction with common846
belief in rationality behaviourally yields Nash equilibrium (Perea, 2012).847
Common Prior Assumption. The common prior assumption is present in both848
Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, and thus underlies correlated equilibrium as well849
as canonical correlated equilibrium. Psychologically, belief hierarchies derived850
from a common prior can be interpreted as exhibiting a kind of symmetry in the851
reasoning of the respective player and his opponents. While the existence of a852
common prior does imply that a player believes that his opponents assign posi-853
tive probability to his true belief hieararchy, a genuine correct beliefs property of854
a common priror is not directly apparent. The exploration of belief hierarchies855
derived from a common prior and any potential correct beliefs properties repre-856
sents an intriguing question for further research. In any case, Nash equilibrium857
and canonical correlated equilibrium implicitly assume simple belief hierarchies858
and one-theory-per-choice, respectively, as correct beliefs properties. Therefore,859
canonical correlated equilibrium is conceptually closer to Nash equilibrium than860
correlated equilibrium is to Nash equilibrium, independent of whether the com-861
mon prior assumption exhibits any correct beliefs flavour, or not.862
Besides, note that there exist further solution concept in the literature based863
on the idea of correlation that entirely dispense with the common prior assump-864
tion such as Aumann’s (1974) subjective correlated equilibrium and Branden-865
burger and Dekel’s (1987) correlated rationalizability. Our results would suggest866
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that an interim characterization of the former solution concept would maintain867
common belief in rationality yet weaken the common prior assumption to a sub-868
jective prior assumption in the sense that the beliefs of every type of a given869
player are derived from the same prior. In contrast, correlated rationalizability870
drops any prior requirement and is simply equivalent to common belief in ratio-871
nality in terms of reasoning.5 The key distinction between correlated equilibrium872
and canonical correlated equilibrium on the one hand and subjective correlated873
equilibrium and correlated rationalizability on the other hand thus lies in the874
common prior assumption which the former solution concepts require yet the875
latter notions lack.876
One-Theory-per-Choice. A player reasoning in line with the epistemic condition877
of one-theory-per-choice uses for each of his opponents’ choices only a single878
first-order belief in his whole belief hierarchy. In other words, a player never uses879
two different first-order beliefs to explain the same choice in his whole belief880
hierarchy. The one-theory-per-choice condition thus keeps a belief hierarchy lean.881
Such a sparsity condition is similar to Perea’s (2012) epistemic notion of simple882
belief hierarchies, which require a belief hierarchy to be entirely generated by a883
tuple of first-order beliefs. Since simple belief hierarchies are closely connected to884
Nash equilibrium and the one-theory-per-choice condition to canonical correlated885
equilibrium, the resemblance between the two conditions in terms of leanness886
gives canonical correlated equilibrium some Nash equilibrium flavour, which is887
absent from correlated equilibrium due to lacking such a leanness condition.888
Potentially, the epistemic hypothesis of one-theory-per-choice could shed light889
on further game theoretic solution concepts such as perfect correlated equilib-890
rium. Dhillon and Mertens (1996) introduce a correlation version of Selten’s891
(1975) notion of perfect equilibrium and show that the revelation principle, i.e.892
the ex-ante equivalence of perfect correlated equilibrium with a canonical rep-893
5 In fact, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) also show that correlated rationalizability
coincides with a a refinement of subjective correlated equilibrium called a posteriori
equilibrium.
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resentation of it, actually fails to hold. It would be interesting to investigate894
whether the one-theory-per-choice condition – or some variant of it – could ex-895
plain this absence of the revelation principle. Similarly, the idea of one-theory-896
per-choice might play a role for the revelation principle of correlated equilibrium897
in more general classes of games, e.g. incomplete information, unawareness, or898
dynamic games. We leave such questions for possible future research.899
Nash Equilibrium. The epistemic analysis of Nash equilibrium (e.g. Aumann900
and Brandenburger, 1995; Perea, 2007; Barelli, 2009; Bach and Tsakas, 2014;901
Bonanno, 2017; Bach and Perea, 2019) has unveiled a correct beliefs assumption902
as the decisive epistemic property of Nash equilibrium. In fact, a correct beliefs903
property also features implicitly in the one-theory-per-choice condition: the rea-904
soner believes that his opponents are correct about his theories, believes that905
his opponents believe that their opponents are correct about his theories, etc.906
Thus, canonical correlated equilibrium exhibits some Nash equilibrium flavour,907
whereas correlated equilibrium does not.908
To some extent, the lack of a correct beliefs assumption for correlated equi-909
librium illustrates its fundamental difference to Nash equilibrium. Intuitively,910
the former solution concept only requires players to behave optimally given the911
opponents’ choice functions, while the latter necessitates players to behave op-912
timally given the opponents’ actual choices.913
Nash equilibrium can be characterized by common belief in rationality to-914
gether with simple belief hierarchies. The correct beliefs assumptions due to915
simple belief hierarchies and one-theory-per-choice can be compared. As the916
whole belief hierarchy is generated by a single tuple of first-order beliefs, the917
condition of simple belief hierarchies directly implies the one-theory-per-choice918
condition. However, it is possible in a belief hierarchy satisfying the one-theory-919
per-choice condition that different choices of some opponent are coupled with920
types inducing distinct first-order beliefs for that opponent, which is impossible921
for simple belief hierarchies, as all choices of a player are explained by only a922
single theory in the reasoner’s entire belief hierarchy. Besides, simple belief hi-923
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erarchies imply independence of the first-order beliefs that they are generated924
with, which is not necessarily the case with belief hierarchies satisfying the one-925
theory-per-choice condition. Therefore, if a type holds a simple belief hierarchy,926
then he also holds one-theory-per-choice, while it is possible that a type holds927
one-theory-per-choice but no simple belief hierarchy.928
The one-theory-per-choice condition thus constitutes a weaker correct beliefs929
assumption than the simplicity condition. It can then be argued that implausi-930
bility criticisms due to implicit correct beliefs properties affect Nash equilibrium931
stronger than canonical correlated equilibrium.932
Besides, correct beliefs inherent in simple belief hierarchies or one-theory-per-933
choice lies entirely inside the mind of the respective reasoner. In this one-person934
perspective sense the notion of correctness used here is distinct from the truth935
axiom (“a proposition is implied by the belief in it”), which is the way correct936
beliefs is typically understood in philosophy. In fact, the truth axiom cannot be937
expressed in the one-person perspective type-based epistemic models used here938
(Definition 3), as a formal notion of state is lacking. In a sense, correct beliefs939
in terms of simple belief hierarchies and one-theory-per-choice is a subjective940
property, while the truth axiom embodies an objective correct beliefs trait.941
Two Distinct Solution Concepts. The epistemic characterizations of correlated942
equilibrium (Theorem 3) and canonical correlated equilibrium (Theorem 4) show943
that the two solution concepts are actually distinct. In addition to common belief944
in rationality and a common prior, canonical correlated equilibrium also requires945
a correct beliefs assumption in form of the one-theory-per-choice condition and946
thus makes stronger epistemic assumption than correlated equilibrium. Intu-947
itively, in a correlated equilibrium a player can justify an opponent’s choice with948
two different first-order beliefs in his reasoning, but not in canonical correlated949
equilibrium. In classical terms, correlated equilibrium and its simplified variant950
differ, because two information cells can induce the same choice yet different951
conditional beliefs for a given player via his choice function in a correlated equi-952
librium, while two different conditioning events, i.e. two distinct choices, always953
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induce different choices in a canonical correlated equilibrium, as the condition-954
ing events in a canonical correlated equilibrium coincide with those choices that955
receive positive weight by the probability measure on the players’ choice combi-956
nations. Hence, canonical correlated equilibrium can be viewed as a special case957
of correlated equilibrium, where different information cells prescribe different958
choices. To support a particular first-order belief in a correlated equilibrium it959
may be crucial to use two information cells inducing the same choice for a given960
player. There generally thus exists more flexibility to build beliefs in a corre-961
lated equilibrium, and to consequently also make choices optimal. To conclude,962
correlated equiilbrium and canonical correlated equilibrium form two distinct963
solution concepts for games based on the idea of correlation.964
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